Rocket Science: USSR’s and USA’s Missile Pits in Justin Barton’s Project

Justin Barton Age 43

British photographer, one of the founders of Deepsleep magazine. Awarded with IPA 2010, 2011 and 2015, KLA Portrait Awards and International Color Awards, Lumia Foundation grantee. Inspired by the works of Andreas Gursky, Vanessa Winship and Anastasia Taylor-Lynd. Favorite books: Chronotopia by Simon Norfolk and Welcome to Pyongyang by Charlie Crane.

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My interest in this kind of history comes from my childhood and that my school was in a large part from the forces. We would regularly debate the number and type of soviet ICBMs between ourselves – I even had a NATO sticker on my locker! I had been working on another series about the Russian version of the Space Shuttle called “Buran” which led me to track down some of the elements of the crafts left in Moscow. I was occasionally told that there were a number of motors and other items that could be visited in Ukraine.

ПAfter getting all of the needed permissions, I was taken to see the silo by one of the ex-Strategic Rocket Forces Missile Combat crew, Vladimir. When you are in the control room the first thing you think of are the people who were in the “other” control room, at least this was true for me. I couldn’t help marveling at this crazy and counterintuitive system that meant that one side was totally reliant on the other to maintain the status quo. Having spoken to other ex-SRF crews through meeting Vladimir, I could see that they were interested in the “other side.” I later found out that in the US this kind of history is well kept and felt that it would only be right to explore that side of things too.
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_01.jpg”, “text”:”Colonel Alexander Tarasenko Ret. ICBM Division and Missile Crew Commander “Naturally, I was prepared to launch. That was our purpose…””}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_02.jpg”, “text”:”Very few personnel had clearance past this door. Ultra-secret, most of the division remained ignorant of the appearance of the interior of Unified Control Post (UCP).”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_03.jpg”, “text”:”Blast doors, each weighing 6,000 pounds, were designed to protect the launch center from either a surface nuclear blast or the explosion of the missile within the silo.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_04.jpg”, “text”:”Captain Tom Garret Ret. ICBM Missile Crew Commander. “I’m sure the missileers of today… do question the policies behind accomplishing that mission… But they will still DO the mission.””}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_05.jpg”, “text”:”The Missile Combat Crew Commander was at the head of a Titan II four person crew responsible for one missile. The USSR SS-24 Scalpel crew could launch 86 missiles”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_06.jpg”, “text”:”In the USSR and CIS launch control functions are entrusted with higher ranking officers in contrast to United States policy. Both faced strict psychological testing.”}

The systems that I photographed would all have been designed before 1989 when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union. The crew generally had to deal with much harder conditions in the USSR – the size of the bunk rooms and control rooms was particularly apparent. Where in the US the Launch Control Centre (LCC) was perhaps 20 meters across, the control room in the USSR around 4 meters diameter. The LCC in the US was hung on enormous springs. The idea was that neither the occupants nor equipment would be damaged by the seismic effects of a nuclear blast and they would be able to respond. In the USSR, they merely used a tube which could be easily removed for maintenance, digging in smaller meant they were able to use more of the earth as protection (the tube systems were based on submarine plans as they could take substantial pressure) and to protect the crew they merely added belts to the seats so in the event of an attack they would not be hurt by being thrown out of their chairs.
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_07.jpg”, “text”:”Captain Les Walker Ret. ICBM Missile Crew Commander. ‘An actual launch feels pretty disappointing. You just can’t see, hear or feel anything in the launch control center. You want to be outside watching it go.’”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_08.jpg”, “text”:”Radio was the major form of communication with the outside world. Large aerials even allowed the crew to watch television 10 meters underground. Sports were a favorite.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_09.jpg”, “text”:”Major Viktor Ksenzov Ret. Missile Guidance Analyst/ICBM Missile Combat Crew Member. ‘As an ICBM missile crew I think we see things differently… we think of civilians as less willing to resolve situations diplomatically…’”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_10.jpg”, “text”:”Fallout in the air could have affected the Missile Crews ability to retaliate. So a backup system was placed deep in the UCP. It was designed for a 45-day survival time.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_11.jpg”, “text”:”With a maximum speed of Mach 4.6 the AS-4 is many times faster than the US Tomahawk. Capable of taking a 1Mt warhead it is currently in the Russian inventory.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_12.jpg”, “text”:”Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Solonenko Ret. Military Intelligence /ICBM Missile Crew Commander. ‘As Head of Intelligence, it was my job to carry the briefcase with one of the three remote launch devices…’”}

I can’t say which would have been more effective, but I know which I would have preferred to have been in. The crews in the USSR were kept on alert for three weeks, in the US just 24 hours and they were even allowed to bring in family to the silo on special occasions. When you look around the facilities in some ways they look remarkably similar (one US missileer quipped that they looked like they’d used the same decorator), but in the US one would find the brand names as logos of the companies that made the equipment, and there was no such equivalent in the USSR.

But the story of Stanislav Petrov (the Soviet officer who did not push the button when he received a false message about the US attack on USSR – Editor’s note) doesn’t support that theory. Also, there was a Soviet experiment that also showed a lack of willingness on the part of the crews to launch when they thought it was real.

I think for the most part they were proud of the fact that they had had this massive responsibility. I think they all wanted to pass on their versions of their history, it must have been so strange to have been in such a situation without being able to tell anyone anything. Vladimir went to the silo everyday for 25 years without ever being able to tell his wife where he was going or what he was doing. I think that many people felt there were things that they would not discuss and I never pressured anyone to tell me more. In Ukraine, several ex-crew members explained that they had been approached by other countries wishing to discover more about their expertise.
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_13.jpg”, “text”:”Set in next to the Blast Lock area this telephone was required to communicate with the other areas outside the blast doors when they were closed.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_14.jpg”, “text”:”Nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) and Aerozine 50 (fuel) are poisonous. Personnel wore these suits during fueling and defueling operations.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_15.jpg”, “text”:”Lieutenant Colonel Sergiy Bublik Ret. Engineer/ICBM Missile Crew Commander. ‘I’d say the espionage must have been excellent… We had to spend more time learning about their systems than our own.'”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_16.jpg”, “text”:”Warhead assembly was a dangerous activity and required a team of highly specialized officers. Near Sevastopol.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_17.jpg”, “text”:”Contained a W-53 warhead. With a yield of 9Mt it was 600 times greater than used at Hiroshima. It would take a train 1500 miles long to carry a TNT explosive equivalent.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_18.jpg”, “text”:”‘Sure we had accidents… today is the anniversary of the day I had rocket fuel spill all over me… The fuel is highly toxic as you know, the suit I was wearing saved my life'”}

I interviewed a US crew member who had become a Nuclear Weapons inspector. I didn’t photograph him in the end, but he explained that his experience as a crew member had allowed him to understand how someone could attempt to build a weapon. He was most interested in finding out if a particular piece of equipment was used by the crews in the USSR as it was made by the Swiss (the US had not been able to make the item with the same tolerances), and he wondered if the Swiss had supplied both sides! In short, I found it fascinating.

One of my greatest realizations is that these systems relied on people; people just like ones you know. I don’t think it’s for me to judge the rights and wrongs, but I do think we need to question the history and the current reality of the system a great deal more. Has the system given us peace or the potential for catastrophe?
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_19.jpg”, “text”:”The technical area for warhead production needed to be protected from radiation as well as blast damage by sealed doors.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_20.jpg”, “text”:”After the stage one engines stopped, the stage two engines were capable of providing a further 100,000lbs of thrust giving the re-entry vehicle a speed of up to 17,000 mph.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_21.jpg”, “text”:”Warrant Officer Vladimir Ishenko Ret. Missile Facilities Technician/ICBM Combat Crew Member ‘…For 25 years my wife had no idea where I was going when I left the house in the morning.'”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_22.jpg”, “text”:”Prototype Rocket Nozzle, Unknown ICBM – USSR/CIS.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_23.jpg”, “text”:”Mark Fulton, Missile Facilities Technician. ‘The keys were just vending machine keys that you could find at any store.'”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_24.jpg”, “text”:”A submarine launched nuclear capable cruise missile. It capabilities were so secret the NATO designation mistakenly covered three distinct missiles.”}

A threat of nuclear war is real. If it wasn’t, there would be no missiles on hard alert. The only situation where there couldn’t be a threat would be if there weren’t any such weapons, but this may or may not be a realistic prospect depending on your view. I think the fall of the Soviet Union was an opportunity that we missed to help the region and smooth over this psychological war. The process of transition suggested by the IMF and US to a market economy was a catastrophe and led to the mafia driven corruption of the 90’s. This, in turn, left the Russians unable to compete militarily.

That is why we are seeing a rise in the use of the description ‘Cold War 2.0’ in the press to describe the proxy wars in Ukraine and Crimea. I hope we can all learn from our mistakes, but the aim of the photographs is to make people examine these things carefully, remember history and with the hope they won’t let it happen again.
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_25.jpg”, “text”:”The stage 2 motor took the re-entry vehicle from 50 miles to 250 miles high, out of the atmosphere and up to a speed of 17,000 mph.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_26.jpg”, “text”:”Electrical ignition fires the black powder charge under the rocket (in green). Once the SS-18 clears the silo are its first-stage motors ignited.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_27.jpg”, “text”:”Staff Sergeant Rick James Ret. ICBM Missile Maintenance Crew: ‘When you first touch a live warhead… well that’s a pretty sobering experience I can tell you.'”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_28.jpg”, “text”:”Whilst Atlas was originally designed for missiles, it was eventually used as a space launch platform placing the first four US astronauts into space.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_29.jpg”, “text”:”Technical Sergeant Mark Nelson Ret. Missile Facilities Technician/ICBM Combat Crew Member: ‘I do worry though that be the international community isolating Russia could indeed bring back the Cold War mentality.'”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_30.jpg”, “text”:”This telephone would have been used to receive the order to launch in the event of a strike on the USSR. The device underneath was used to encrypt communications.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_31.jpg”, “text”:”Minuteman II ICBM (Internals) – US.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_32.jpg”, “text”:”All the pipework in the complex is marked carefully with labels; whether rocket fuel or telephone cables. These pipes were set into the concrete walls themselves.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_33.jpg”, “text”:”Captain Bob Rice Ret. ICBM Missile Combat Crew Commander: ‘We would never have struck first back then… which was why I was upset when we went into Iraq.'”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_34.jpg”, “text”:”Thor IRBM was the first operational ballistic missile deployed by the U.S. Air Force (USAF).”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_35.jpg”, “text”:”Re-entry Vehicle. Thor IRBM – UK/USA.”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_36.jpg”, “text”:”Jay Pritchard, Missile Maintenance Crew. ‘When they visited and were in the control room the [Russian] Colonel asked me “So. How many of your missiles are pointed at my house?” I replied “87… but how many are pointed at my house?” He paused for a moment and then said “more than that”…”}
{“img”: “/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Barton_37.jpg”, “text”:”The SS-18 is the current backbone of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. It was designed by the Yuzhnoye Bureau in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. For many years Russia relied on Ukrainian expertise to provide maintenance even after the fall of the USSR.”}